Chimera 拼接的怪獸

 Michel Foucault, <Security, Territory, Population> (Picador, 2017)

節譯自英譯本

頁41-42

這一看待事物與處理事務的新方式隱含著重要的改變：如何去面對稀缺---這一令人恐懼的事件--它導致物價上升，並可能引發暴亂。在此之前，飢荒這一類的災難是一種同時作用在個體與群體層面上的現象，只要有人挨餓，那麼人群以及整個國家也會挨餓；正是因為飢荒能夠迅速讓人群命運在如此巨大的尺度上緊密相連，它才被看作是一種災變。現在，如我剛剛所講述的這種政治-經濟規劃將會導致什麼樣的結果呢？簡言之，作為事件的飢荒將被劃分為兩個不同的層面。用來規制穀物交易的種種限制性的法案被取消之後，如阿貝爾所言，稀缺將成為一種拼接怪獸（chimera）的現象：首先，稀缺被看作是一種自然產生的現實，而即便它真的發生了，也不過是某些錯誤人為因素偶然產生的副產物。因此，從此稀缺將不再作為災變而存在，不再有如此破壞性巨大的、同時作用在個人與群體層面上的飢餓發生。因為市場調節供給，不再會有人口層面上的飢荒。但這意味著什麼呢？意味著我們通過“放任”（laissez-faire）的手段控制了稀缺，通過“放任事物流通無阻”來實現自然的供需平衡。也就是意味著，當物價想要提升時，便放手任其提升。一旦稀缺的苗頭出現，我們便放手任其發展到一個甚至數個市場範圍內，而這一新的現實（稀缺）終將自行產生自我控制與調劑的趨勢。因此，總體性的稀缺將被根除，但這同時也意味著在某些區域，某些市場，某些個人將經歷物價飛漲、買不起糧食繼而餓死的結果。然而，通過放任這些人餓死，我們從而達到了不讓稀缺影響全體人群的目的，從而消滅了此前作為災變的大飢荒。因此，作為事件的稀缺被一分為二。作為災變的稀缺消失了，然而導致個人死亡的稀缺不但不會消失，而且必須不能消失。

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按：把“稀缺”與“飢荒”置換為“新冠感染”，便可明白我們目前身處的拼接怪獸的時代。在地球一端，不成其為災變的個體默默死去。另一端，因為恐懼災變而不顧一切地阻止人們死於新冠，卻從而導致更大層面上的災變。

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chimera_(mythology)#/media/File:Chimera_Apulia_Louvre_K362.jpg

06/24 除草

翻譯終於初步脫稿。二十二萬多字。好像忽然有在別處寫中文的餘裕了，因此特來除草。

公投營造一種直至最後一刻都還不確定的懸念，但右轉的總體態勢早已清晰。在電視直播前度過整晚的人們，無法面對、拒絕理解投票人群中百分之五十二的好惡，似乎只是在浪費時間、絞著手無所作為。臉書上一位好友的評論：新自由主義以及反新自由主義的政治正在走向終結。在發達國家中，流行玩轉後民族主義（後現代）政治數十年，而今則被重新湧動的民族主義政治當面一擊。而如Patrick Cockburn在最近的倫敦書評報導中所說，第三國家則患上了所謂的「索馬里症候群」－－即原本專制但穩定而世俗的民族國家紛紛破產，取而代之的是以極端宗教教義為旗幟的新型「超國家」。西方知識界忙著「在民族主義史學的棺材板上釘釘」，卻發現自己門前失火，好似回到十九世紀。

我們需要努力去理解新的政治光譜的形成，及其在廣泛社會層面可能的後果。

C鎮的初夏依然美麗。每每有一種自己的本命月、快要轉運的錯覺。時而想起在這裡度過的第一個夏天，低垂而輕盈的雲朵，讓人心中熨帖。昨晚是夏至後一天，從超市買好東西出來，西面天空有酒紅色的晚霞。湖畔的草花大抵是連綿盛開、紫紫黃黃，而人家園子裏輪到的是野百合、月季和細小的薔薇。今年不知怎的還沒有注意到繡球花。

一本書交代過去，另一本書在心裡逐漸成形。每天能做一點也好。

12/30 - Apathy is not apolitical

(In the context of contemporary China)

Liberals are mistaken when they work with an overly narrow definition of politics as none other than organized dissent, thereby equating participatory apathy with political apathy.  It is only natural, then, that they see the "apolitical" mass as being deluded and coaxed into obedient subjects of an authoritarian state.

Conservatives are mistaken when they insist on the personal nature of their politics, thereby taking a cynical stance toward all interpersonal (often dubbed "universal") values.  The process of "conversion" from liberal to conservative among young Chinese today is often triggered by personal encounters with a "hostile" foreign ideology, e.g. study/work abroad.  Having arrived at this intensely personal, even egoistic political stance, they feel insulted by the liberal criticism of their being "apathy" and "apolitical," hence the frequent analogy to liberal "preaching" of "gospels".

What would a more capacious sphere of politics look like?  Some may say that it is not even possible without major external changes to the nation.  A more urgent question to me, it seems, is whether we are capable of imagining it, and willing to acknowledge one's own limitations.

10/20 - The Barricade and the Law

Eric Hazan's latest book, <La barricade: Histoire d'un objet révolutionnaire> (Autrement 2013), consists of eleven vignettes of this "revolutionary object" in French history.  The first vignette concerns the religious wars of 1570-1580s, when a Catholic-dominated Paris rose up against the Protestant successor to the throne, Henry the Navarre, and Hazan identified this moment as the earliest usage of the word "barricade" to describe some sort of improvised barrier in popular resistance to governmental forces.  The barricade of the Baroque era, however, shared little in common with its heroic reappearance in the years *after* the French Revolution of 1789.  It was not until after the victory of the 1830 Revolution when the barricade was enthroned as a heroic revolutionary object in French history, and later portrayals repeatedly invoked iconic images such as Eugene Delacroix in La liberté guidant le peuple.  In it, students, workers, and Bohemians fought side by side in solidarity.  The very longevity of this Romantic image, however, risks obscuring the fact that barricades, as a strategic prop of urban conflict, hardly enjoyed any success after June 1848.  When cannons were brought in for the preservation of public order, the barricade becomes more of a symbolic gesture, a theatrical prop - more than anything else.  So it was in the last days of the Paris Commune in 1871.  So it was in the student protest of 1968.  Hazan suggests that the barricade shall live on not in its original physical form (furnitures, make-shift objects picked up from the streets, flags, etc.), but perhaps in the *blockage* of other repressive forces in other arenas.

Many parts of the present book have already been presented in one of Hazan's previous books, <The Invention of Paris> (English translation available from Verso in 2010).  In it, Hazan reconstructed city maps marked with the locations of barricade, a lot of which he used again in the present book.  Quoting copiously from contemporary authors, among whom most prominently Victor Hugo, Hazan was explicit in his admiration for Hugo's vivid and soul-searching prose.  For those who get to know Hugo primarily from the Broadway reconstruction of <Les Miserables>, it might be sobering to read how Hugo emerged from his guilty conscience after siding with the establishment in June 1848 to create this powerful tale of personal redemption.  While present-day mobilization of Hugo tends to play up the heroic, upbeat side of it ("Did you hear the people sing?"), it is striking how the story was written *after* the heyday of the real barricade, in an altered age when Bourgeoisie horror of the mob held the day.  The tension between Javert, ever the guardian of law and public order, and Jean Valjean, fugitive, guilty of past crimes, but closer than anyone to the idea of human compassion, ought to be the real take away from Hugo's tour de force.

A couple of weeks ago the world's media witnessed the speedy construction of barricades on the streets of Hong Kong, which was followed by equally speedy (if messy) destruction overnight.  While the pro-activist side was quick to invoke the iconic, ever theatrical power of the barricade, the pro-establishment organs dutifully play the practical role by attacking the barricade as "unlawful," "naïve," and "dangerous."  To the chagrin of those who cared, "Did you hear the people sing" has become one of the mainstays of popular protest in Asia today - I never liked it, for how can it bring real solidarity across social strata, if only the English-speaking, Broadway-following crowd could feel the elation after singing it?  In any case, what's important is the mix-up of roles here in this new chapter of the barricade's history - the communists (and local financial gurus) backing up the rule of law, while old enemies of the barricade voicing support for the protestors from Europe and the US.  It is both anachronistic and dangerous to interpret the Barricade only as an icon of some non-existent revolutionary past.  And reading Hazan at least gives one pause to think what has happened between now and then.

10/06 The Wall and the Other

Rain and wind washing all along the east coast.  Insulated in the train, the travelers were more quiet than usual.  I could only imagine, but not hear any sound of water - raindrops splashing on the window, river torrents below the bridge, and occasionally, a glimpse of the dark, roaring ocean.  Some gloomy thought was brooding in my head.  It no longer feels as gloomy now that two days have come to pass.  But nevertheless it exists:

I have come to understand the predicament faced by advocates of liberal ideas in China today.  On the one hand there is this protracted struggle with local repression and censorship.  It is important to note that the GFW (Great Firewall) in fact could not cut off the flow of information at large, but merely worked to ensure that no stable references to information can last.  The ephemeral nature of exchange and contention makes it less visible not only to people in China, but also to observers on the other side of the wall.

On the other hand, the talks of Communist China as an "authoritarian regime" & the frantic jingoism with which many Western mass media prophesied its doom only served to alienate a key group of Chinese constituency - the youngest, brightest, and most resourceful generation, coming of age at the turn of the millennium.  This generation faces the daunting task of articulating its own vocabulary of politics, and it goes without saying that whether liberal or conservative opinions would prevail among them matters very, very much for China's future.

It is at this juncture that ideological hostility toward Communist China in Western media in fact *helped* its nemesis, the communist party, in pushing a large group of young Chinese into the habit of prioritizing realpolitik (China vs. the West) above all other forms of political life.  A deep sense of marginalization by mainstream US society provides fertile grounds for conservative political stances to brew.  While the CCP uses the Great Firewall to "protect its people from the Other," the West reinforced the wall by ostracizing mainland Chinese as an ignorant, ill-informed, and complacent people who dared not to fight for its own future.  The wall, though more porous than it claims to be, thereby manages to perpetuate a quasi-Cold War logic by constituting the Other from both sides.  It is thus no surprise that some of the most cynical comments on democracy and liberalism I've heard to this day all came from Chinese students who have been through college education in the US.

And so conservative political opinion has come of age in the community of Chinese, both at home and overseas.  It attracts brilliant employees of the Wall Street and the Silicon Valley, and finds ready endorsement in the business community and beyond.  It is a reassuring option to always have a "home country" to side with in the turbulent years as a foreign sojourner, and it makes the ugly realities of politics in the US and elsewhere easier to comprehend.  In the end, persuading them to accept liberal ideas becomes all the more difficult: the burden is now on the liberal person's shoulder to have to prove that in some cases at least, liberalism's "universal values" hold a greater promise of flourishing and well-being than the other options, of which there are many: social-darwinism (or a more subdued version of pragmatism), nationalism/racism, ultra-leftist Maoism, and restoration of rigid "Confucian" ethics, to name but a few.

Time is slipping away from our hands, as more damage is being done every hour: old-time friendship turning sour by new stigma; social media exchanges pushing people to take sides by "likes" or "shares"; academic collaborations with "authoritarian countries" being severed on an ideological basis, etc, etc.  Sometimes one wonders whether the spinning-away of our worlds these days really resulted from some secret conspiracy between the power-brokers.  But the realist in your head says no, it does not even require any formal conspiracy; and the idealist aches, tremendously.

09/29 - How conversations about HK end

(Notes from a Wechat group whose members were mostly young professionals and students of my generation [late 20s and early 30s]. The statements below were translated and paraphrased from a heated discussion within that group earlier today. The order does not reflect the original sequence in which they appeared, but each could be seen as an attempt to persuade others in the group to side with him/her.)

1. The economic downturn of HK is inevitable (natural) given the recent rise of Shanghai. The former colony loses its strategic relevance as a result.
1.1 Recent unrests happened because the protestors attempted to "politicize" an economic problem.

2. No, HK discontent in fact stems from mainland manipulation of its economy.

3 (countering 2). HK is in fact doing better than Japan because of its strong ties with the mainland.
3.1 A student of economics cited recent analysis of HK's economic dependence on the mainland, expressing further interest in empirically testing this topic.

4. HKers used to be obedient toward the colonial regime; now the same people turned to their own government in a defiant way, demanding for more than they deserve.

4.1 They are, in essence, former slaves possessed by a false sense of superiority toward the mainlanders.  Look at the prevalent hate speech (the "locust" talk and all) against mainland tourists in the last few years.

5. For HKers, it's all about contract. Beijing promised HK a popular election in 2017, so the people were merely demanding for that. For Beijing though, it's about authority and obedience. Hence there's a clash of values (sympathetic to the protesters)

6 (in response to 5). False. It's not a question of authority, but a question of who prevails over whom. Look at the US in the world.

7. Following up on 6: Our government (Beijing) is tough. It does not make a big fuss over helping other people or being tricked by others. Think of the '97 financial crisis & the central aid to HK. Let the dogs bark.

8. At this point the group administrator tried to steer conversation away, fearing that the quarrel would escalate into personal attacks. A young lawyer objected that each voice has its value. The person who made points 6 & 7 was temporarily banned from the group, along with another ID.

9. Discussion ends with a call for more presentation of "hard currency" (Ch. yinghuo), or "facts" (in English), and the administrator regrets over his intervention. The two people banned from the discussion were invited to join again.

===============

A couple of thoughts:

-- The remarkable imprint of Marxist political economy (part of mandatory "politics" curriculum in secondary and high school) on people's minds.  Result: people were very good at working out the economic underpinnings of conflicts (see 1-3).  They also readily grasp history in a Hegelian sense - teleology and all.  Some embrace economic/geographic determinism (HK's rise and fall vis-à-vis Shanghai).

-- Paradox: Marxism teaches one to understand politics in economic terms.  But my friends (1.1) seem to think that it should NOT be "politicized".

-- Solution: the "politicizing" (zhengzhihua) refers to "making a big fuss" out of proportion, beyond what it ought to take.  If pressed, my friend will probably respond that the proper Marxist analysis of HK's plight must involve some kind of redistribution of wealth, not to quarrel over some trivial electoral matters.

-- Three main uses of history: the trope of colonialism/imperialism followed by "liberation" (4); social Darwinism (6) that borders on nihilism; the essence of "Chinese politics" being always about centralizing hegemony & obedience (5).

-- (4) has clearly been taught in classrooms.  People became rightfully tired of it, and they either resort to (6) or (5).  None, however, acknowledges the push for a more flexible, more liberal political system as a justifiable/realistic cause for collective action.

-- But everybody involved in this conversation, in fact, liked to have a place, a group in which they could speak out freely.  They were genuinely disturbed by the prospect of any major violence.  As well-trained scientists and professionals (many work for the financial sector in New York, or global consulting companies), they also do not object to more "empirical truths" ("hard currency" (yinghuo), another economic metaphor).  Guess there's reason to be hopeful in the end.

09/28 This political life of ours

What troubles me today:
1. Posts on HK, & even pro-government comments on Chinese social networks disappearing before my eyes;
2. The cacophony of media coverage going viral on facebook, blaming "the big brother" as the convenient target for the violence. Left-leaning critics opined that corruption in local, not central, politics is equally at fault. Of course it is impossible to sever the two as cause-and-effect.
3. The stark contrast between 1 & 2.
3'. No, 1 & 2 in fact reinforced each other.
4. As a result of 3', I cannot endorse a vision in which pro-democratic victory is predicated by further ostracizing the other side.
4'. In other words, Cold War mentality is returning, aligning itself quickly on both sides of the Great Fire Wall.
5. Which makes it really difficult to speak to either the eerie void (1), or the enthusiasm of (2).
5'. This stand-off between two ideologies is an extension of the debate around the New Left in the early 00s. But this time around, communication barrier provided the mold for barricades of the mind. Suppose the GFW went down over night - chances are the reading public will remain polarized and talk past each other.
5''. The shadow of censorship lives on as the surrogate for the same.
6. & I cannot even do a decent job explaining this to a concerned colleague in three minutes.

What to do:
1. To accept this situation as evident of a political configuration that our generation will have to live with and confront, on an everyday basis;
2. To have faith in the fact that analysis and criticism can be applied to both extremes, with equal vigor, regardless of one's standing point on any particular matter;
3. To disengage as a way of "protest" is not an option. Only through engagement with a complex reality can one identify the human reason for moving on.
4. To practice history is, in an important sense, to weigh and deliberate over the influence of ideologies.
4'. If any idea makes you uneasy, try taking it apart to understand its appeal to other ppl.
4''. If you really believe in something, be prepared to refine it, & make it more accommodating to all sorts of realities (not just the ones you like).
5. Perhaps this is the venue in which our political life will unfold (other issues may require a different form of participation). It's transnational, schizophrenic (severed but always cross-referenced), and austere for those who aren't content with mere entertainment.
6. Live it in full, live it in earnest. Because life is precious.